RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS, DIVERSITY, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Vinay Harpalani*
For the last 40 years, race-conscious university admissions policies have
been perhaps the most litigated constitutional issue before the U.S. Supreme
Court. In that time, the Court has considered five cases on the merits: Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)1; Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)2; Grutter v.
Bollinger (2003)3; Fisher v. Texas (Fisher I) (2013)4; and Fisher v. Texas (Fisher II)
(2016).5 Two other lawsuits, one against Harvard University and the other
against the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, are now in the lower
federal courts.6 These cases could potentially reach the Supreme Court by
the early 2020s.
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438 U.S. 265 (1978) [hereinafter Bakke].
539 U.S. 244 (2003) [hereinafter Gratz].
539 U.S. 306 (2003) [hereinafter Grutter].
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) [hereinafter Fisher I].
136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher II]. Additionally, the Supreme Court agreed with a
District Court’s ruling in Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam) (reversing Court of
Appeals’ denial of summary judgement for University of Texas at Austin after it was accused of
employing admissions policy that violated 14th Amendment). Further, it did not rule on the
constitutional merits in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1974) (holding petitioner’s case,
in which he complained that respondent discriminated against him on account of his race in
violation of Equal Protection Clause, as moot due to imminence of his graduation from same school
which had initially denied him admission).
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, No. 14-cv-14176ADB, 2019 WL 4786210, at *1 (D. Mass. Sept. 20, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-2005 (1st Cir. Oct.
11, 2019); Students For Fair Admissions, Inc., v. University of North Carolina et al., No.
1:14CV954, 2019 WL 4773908 at *1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30, 2019) (denying parties’ cross motions
for summary judgement). See generally PROJECT ON FAIR REPRESENTATION, https://www.proj
ectonfairrepresentation.org/cases/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2019) (listing cases litigated by an advocacy
organization dedicated to challenging “racial and ethnic classifications in state and federal courts”).
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Supreme Court rulings on race-conscious admissions have focused on the
Fourteenth Amendment.7 However, there is also an important First
Amendment component to race-conscious admissions policies. These
policies reflect a core First Amendment value: academic freedom. This Essay
illustrates that there are two different ways that race-conscious admissions
policies promote academic freedom. First, a university’s selection of its own
student body is itself an aspect of academic freedom. Second, by facilitating
the admission of a more diverse student body, race-conscious admissions
policies contribute to another aspect of academic freedom: the “marketplace
of ideas” on campus.
Justice Felix Frankfurter laid out the basic judicial framework for
universities’ academic freedom under the First Amendment. His widelycited 1957 concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire listed “the four essential
freedoms”:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in
which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.8

The language here was not central to the Sweezy ruling, but the Court has
often cited it when discussing academic freedom.
In particular, the fourth “essential freedom” to choose “who may be
admitted to study” has taken on wider significance. Race-conscious
admissions policies are in one sense rooted in this freedom. In his highly
influential controlling opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
(1978), Justice Lewis Powell opined that:
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The
freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes
the selection of its student body.9

Justice Powell held that universities could use race as a “plus factor” in
admissions, so long as they did not set aside a specific number of seats for
7

8

9

Bakke and Gratz also involved Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and SFFA v. Harvard also
centers on Title VI. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (“No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”). Further, mootness was the primary issue in DeFunis, 416
U.S. at 319–320, and standing was a significant issue in both Fisher cases. See, e.g., Transcript of
Oral Argument at 3–4, 7, 55, 73–74, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Transcript of
Oral Argument at 35–38, Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (No. 14-981).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing ALBERT
VAN DE SANDT CENTLIVRES ET AL., THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 11-12 (1957))
(emphasis added).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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minority applicants.10 No other Justice joined Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke, but his view gained a majority on the Supreme Court in Grutter v.
Bollinger (2003). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s Grutter majority opinion
cited and affirmed Justice Powell’s concurrence, noting that “universities
occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition”—one that
“recogniz[es] a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment,
of educational autonomy.”11 Grutter held that this autonomy allowed
universities to use race-conscious policies to attain the educational benefits of
diversity—which Grutter ruled was a compelling state interest.12 This holding
was later affirmed in Fisher I13 and Fisher II.14
The Court has not explicitly stated the limits of the fourth “essential
freedom”, but its equal protection rulings embody some of those limits.15 In
Bakke, the Court rejected racial set-asides which guaranteed a particular
number or percentage of admissions slots to members of underrepresented
minority groups.16 Also, in Gratz v. Bollinger, the Justices struck down a
mechanical point system which awarded a set number of points to all
members of particular minority groups.17 In Grutter however, the Court ruled
that a holistic admissions plan was narrowly tailored and thus
constitutional.18 The Grutter plan employed individualized review of
applicants and used race in a flexible manner, in conjunction with other
aspects of an individual’s application.19 So long as universities used such a
plan to individually assess applicants’ contribution to the educational benefits
of diversity, it was constitutional. All of these are judicial limits imposed on
the fourth “essential freedom.”
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Id. at 315–317 (arguing that, to be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
use a quota system, but instead, may consider race or ethnicity only as a ‘“plus” in a particular
applicant’s file, without “insulat[ing] the individual from comparison with all other candidates for
the available seats.”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 343.
133 S. Ct. at 2419.
136 S. Ct. at 2208.
In addition to race, the Court has considered single gender institutions. For example, in U.S. v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s male-only admissions
policy. 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996). Earlier, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court also
struck down a female-only admissions policy. 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–320 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he fatal flaw in petitioner’s
preferential program is” that some racial groups are “totally excluded from a specific percentage of
the seats in an entering class.”).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (holding that a “policy [which] automatically distributes 20 points to every
single applicant from an ‘underrepresented minority’ group” violates Fourteenth Amendment).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 337.
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But what about limits from the states? In the wake of Grutter, Professor J.
Peter Byrne argued that “Grutter clarified that academic freedom is a real
constitutional right . . . .”20 Professor Byrne suggested that any state law that
prevents a university from considering race in admissions is unconstitutional
as a violation of the First Amendment.21 However, a First Amendment right
is a proscription on state action, and Professor Byrne acknowledged that
possession of such a right by a public university—which is itself a part of the
state—is “surprising” and “peculiar.”22
In fact, states have limited university admissions policies by various
means. State constitutional amendments, enacted through popular
referendum, are one example. Several states have passed state constitutional
bans on race-conscious policies in this manner: California (1996),
Washington (1998), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008), Arizona (2010), and
Oklahoma (2012).23 Michigan’s ban was challenged, but in Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action (2014), the Supreme Court upheld it.24 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion noted that Schuette “is not about how the debate
about racial preferences should be resolved . . . [i]t is about who may resolve
it.”25 Despite the First Amendment-based “essential freedom” of universities
to choose their own student bodies, the parties litigated Schuette solely on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds.26 The only mention of First Amendment
rights in Schuette was the freedom of the voters who voted on the ban.27
States can also ban race-conscious admissions policies via legislative
action. In 2011, New Hampshire’s state legislature passed a state law
banning such policies.28 Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law, which was at the
20
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J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real About the “Four Freedoms” of a
University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929, 934 (2006).
Id. at 937 (“From my reading of Grutter, strong arguments arise that any state law that bars the use
of race in state university admissions violates constitutional academic freedom.”).
Id. at 938 (noting that state university is government apparatus but is also afforded First Amendment
rights protecting it from government).
See generally Dominique J. Baker, Why Might States Ban Affirmative Action, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
Apr. 12, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2019/04/12/whymight-states-ban-affirmative-action/ (mapping American states that banned affirmative action
between 1996 and 2012).
572 U.S. 291, 314–15 (2014) (“There is no authority in the Constitution of the United States or in
this Court’s precedents for the Judiciary to set aside Michigan laws that commit this policy
determination to the voters.”).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 298 (“The Court . . . must determine whether an amendment to the Constitution of the State
of Michigan . . . is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
Id. at 312–13 (“It is the right to speak and debate and learn and then, as a matter of political will,
to act through a lawful electoral process.”).
H.R. 0623, 2001 Sess. (N.H. 2011) (enacted) (prohibiting “preferences in recruiting, hiring,
promotion, or admission by state agencies, the university system, the community college system,
and the postsecondary education commission.”).
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heart of the controversy in Fisher I and Fisher II, significantly curbs Texas
public universities’ autonomy to determine which students are admitted to
study.29 This law guarantees admission to all public universities in Texas to
the top students in all Texas high schools.30 It essentially allows the state
legislature to determine a large percentage of Texas public universities’
student bodies. Other states have also adopted similar plans.31
Additionally, Florida Governor Jeb Bush eliminated race-conscious
policies by executive order32—a ban that is still in place. Thus, all three
branches of government can curb universities’ fourth “essential freedom.”
First Amendment challenges to any of these actions would almost
certainly fail under Schuette. So how much autonomy do universities have to
determine their own student bodies? In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that the
fourth “essential freedom” is “not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right” but rather “a special concern of the First Amendment.”33 Through Bakke,
Grutter, and Fisher, the Court has held that the First Amendment’s “special
concern” with academic freedom is a limited principle of judicial deference.
Within the context of race-conscious admissions, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that courts should give deference to universities in defining
their educational missions. Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion first noted the
principle of judicial deference in the context of race-conscious admissions
policies:
Universities . . . may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic
background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate
educational purpose.
So long as the university proceeds on an
individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial
interference in the academic process.34

29

30
31

32

33
34

TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (1997) (“[E]ach general academic teaching institution shall admit
an applicant for admission to the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant graduated
with a grade point average in the top 10 percent of the student’s high school graduating class in one
of the two school years preceding the academic year for which the applicant is applying for
admission . . . .”).
Id.
See generally Richard D. Kahlenberg, A Better Affirmative Action: State Universities that Created Alternatives
to Racial Preferences, CENTURY FOUNDATION 26–61 (2012), https://productiontcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2012/10/03175956/tcf_abaa-8.pdf (describing the affirmative action
policies of California, Washington, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and New
Hampshire).
Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999) (“I hereby request that the Board of Regents implement a
policy prohibiting the use of racial or gender set-asides, preferences or quotas in admissions to all
Florida institutions of higher education effective immediately.”).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)).
Id. at 319 n.53.
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Subsequently, in Grutter, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion held that:
The Law School’s educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. […] Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s
academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed limits . . . . “[G]ood
faith” on the part of a university is “presumed” absent “a showing to the
contrary.”35

Fisher I reiterated this holding in part, in a majority opinion by Justice
Anthony Kennedy. The scope of this principle of judicial deference was the
only issue decided by the Court in Fisher I. With an unexpected 7-1 ruling,
Fisher I reiterated Grutter’s holding that the courts should, within limits, defer
to universities’ academic decisions.36 Fisher I also made clear that a university
“receives no deference” from the reviewing court on whether the “means
chosen by the [u]niversity to attain diversity are narrowly tailored. . . .”37
Fisher II did not alter this framework: it merely held that the University of
Texas at Austin’s race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored.38
These cases indicate that the fourth “essential freedom” is a First
Amendment-based principle of limited judicial deference, not a full-fledged
right. Courts defer to a university’s “good faith” assertion that diversity has
educational benefits which promote the university’s mission. As noted by
Professor Paul Horwitz, a “natural reading of the Court’s opinion in Grutter
suggests that, far from deferring to the general expertise of academic officials,
the Court here was actively endorsing the educational benefits of diversity.”39
Because attaining these benefits is a compelling state interest, the fourth
“essential freedom” here is essentially universities’ freedom to use race as an
admissions factor to attain them, subject to narrow tailoring limits.
But the compelling interest in diversity is a significant exception in the
Supreme Court’s current race-based equal protection jurisprudence.
Supreme Court rulings on race have generally espoused an anti-classification
principle—one that strongly disfavors any racial classifications.40
35
36

37
38
39
40

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S., at 318–319).
See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328) (explaining that some, but not
complete, judicial deference is proper regarding Universities’ statements of their educational
mission and subsequent enrollment policies).
Id. at 2420.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (2016).
Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 499 (2005).
See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9-10 (2003) (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976)) (defining antisubordination as the principle “that
law should reform institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically
oppressed groups[,]” and defining anticlassification as principle “that the government may not
classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category . . . .”).
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Colorblindness, rather than race-consciousness, is preferred unless strict
scrutiny is met. Grutter and the other affirmative action cases thus invoke a
constitutional conflict: a choice between the First Amendment’s “special
concern” with universities’ academic freedom and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s proscription on government use of race. In this context, the
question is, why has the Supreme Court favored universities’ academic
freedom to admit a diverse student body over the colorblind ideal of current
equal protection doctrine? As put by Justice Clarence Thomas, why has the
Court created a “First Amendment . . . basis for . . . universities to do what
would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause”?41
This Essay argues that the reason lies not only in fourth “essential
freedom,” but also in the nature of diversity itself. Diversity encompasses
another aspect of academic freedom, because diversity within a student body
enhances the “marketplace of ideas” on campus, and this enhances student
learning.
The marketplace of ideas notion harks back to the origins of academic
freedom, well before Justice Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence. Professor
Robert Post describes how academic freedom emerged from the First
Amendment to protect a marketplace of ideas that “produces knowledge.”42
In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States
(1919) asserted that “free trade in ideas” was the best path to “truth,” via
“competition in the market” and “experiment.”43 The marketplace of ideas
is the notion that academic freedom should allow free exchange of ideas,
similar to goods and services in the economy.44 While the goal of traditional
economic exchange is typically profit or value gain, the purpose of a free
market of ideas is to discover the “truth.”45 The First Amendment’s
protection of speech allows the free exchange of ideas, and the “special
concern” with academic freedom relates the important function of
universities (and the scholars within them) to discover the “truth.”46
Future Supreme Court decisions adopted Justice Holmes’ ideas. For
example, in Red Lion Broad. v. FCC (1969), the Court noted that “it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth shall ultimately prevail . . . .”47 The marketplace of ideas
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM at x (2012).
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also POST, supra note 42, at x (discussing First
Amendment and the marketplace of ideas).
POST, supra note 42, at x.
Id. at xi.
Id. at x.
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See also POST, supra note 42, at x (discussing Justice Holmes’ description
of the First Amendment’s protection of the free trade of ideas).
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notion has been widely critiqued,48 but it has unquestionably influenced First
Amendment jurisprudence on academic freedom.49
Traditionally, discourse on academic freedom and the marketplace of
ideas has emphasized “freedom of inquiry” to conduct research and
exchange ideas.50 This discourse focuses on exchanges between scholars—
usually experts in a given field.51 However, the marketplace notion also
extends to exchanges between faculty and students, and between students
themselves. The Supreme Court has recognized this, beginning with its
majority opinion in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967): “[t]he classroom is
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”52 Healy v. James (1972) applied this
idea specifically to higher education: “[t]he college classroom with its
surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’”53 where the
purpose is not merely to transmit knowledge, but to develop critical thinking
skills necessary to produce knowledge.54 This is true not only of classrooms,55
but of all venues and activities on campus.56
Diversity among students is key to a thriving marketplace of ideas in the
classroom and on campus generally. Such a marketplace must include
students with different experiences and perspectives. When Justice Powell
discussed diversity in Bakke, he tied its educational benefits to the
“safeguarding [of] academic freedom” through the “robust exchange of
ideas[.]”57 He added that an “atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and
creation’—so essential to the quality of higher education—is widely believed
to be promoted by a diverse student body.”58 Bakke thus directly tied diversity

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

56

57
58

This Essay argues that the major critiques of the “marketplace of ideas” apply to the production of
scholarship, not to student learning. See infra text accompanying notes 69–76.
See, e.g., POST, supra note 42, at x-xi (noting the Supreme Court’s frequent invocation of First
Amendment principles to support a marketplace of ideas and debate on public issues).
See id. at 65 (listing “freedom of inquiry and research” as necessary element of academic freedom).
See id. at xi–xii (discussing contradiction inherent in applying the marketplace of ideas notion to
expert knowledge).
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603) (holding that state
college could not deny official recognition of student group under the First Amendment).
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1032 (1971).
Having diversity of perspectives and experiences may be more appropriate and beneficial in some
classes than in others. For example, science and math classes often tend towards one correct
answer, whereas those in the humanities focus more on having various perspectives and different
interpretations of phenomena.
See Vinay Harpalani, “Safe Spaces” and the Educational Benefits of Diversity, 13 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUBLIC POL’Y 117, 152 (2017) (discussing educational importance of diversity within the classroom
as well as other settings on college campuses).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
Id.
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to the values inherent in the marketplace of ideas—and thus to the virtues of
academic freedom.
Twenty-five years after Bakke, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Grutter linked these educational benefits to race-conscious
admissions policies aimed at admitting a “critical mass”59 of
underrepresented minority students:
[C]ritical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that
diversity is designed to produce. These benefits are substantial . . . . [and
include] . . . promot[ing] “cross-racial understanding,” help[ing] to break
down racial stereotypes, and “enable[ing] [students] to better understand
persons of different races.” These benefits are “important and laudable,”
because “classroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting” when the students have “the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds.”60

Justice O’Connor further noted that “when a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their
force because nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but
rather a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”61 Justice O’Connor
thus applied the marketplace notion to the “variety of viewpoints” among
minority students,62 and Fisher I and II affirmed this view.63
Grutter also cited social science studies that illustrated the links between
diversity and the marketplace of ideas on campus. The amicus brief of the
American Educational Research Association et al. noted that student body
diversity can “challenge students to consider alternative viewpoints.”64
59
60
61
62

63

64

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (holding University of Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy
constitutional under Equal Protection Clause and discussing benefits of diversity at the law school).
Id. (last alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 319–20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Justice O’Connor also highlighted the long-term benefits of diversity for national and global
leadership. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (“[M]ajor American businesses have made clear that the
skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”); Id. at 331 (“[H]igh-ranking retired officers
and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability
to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.’”) (citation omitted) (alternation in
original).
See, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (“The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond
race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes.”); Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210 (“enrolling a diverse student body ‘promotes cross-racial
understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables students to better understand
persons of different races.’”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
Brief of Am. Educ. Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-041). Other studies cited in Grutter also supported this
notion. See, e.g., Gary Orfield, Introduction to DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1, 15 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender, eds., 2001) (“There is
powerful evidence to show that admitting minority students is likely to bring onto the campus

110

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. XX:N

Additionally, a study by Professor Gary Orfield and Dean Whitla noted that
“interactions with diverse peers (in terms of race, interests, and values)” led
to “a greater openness to diverse perspectives and a willingness to challenge
their own beliefs of the first year of college.”65
Beyond its articulation of the compelling interest in diversity, the
Supreme Court’s narrow tailoring principles for race-conscious admissions
also reinforce the educational value of different perspectives. In order to be
narrowly tailored, Bakke and Grutter require that a race-conscious admissions
policy applies flexible, individualized review, with race as one factor among
many.66 Such a policy promotes the educational benefits of diversity because
unlike the policies rejected in Bakke and Gratz, it involves assessment of the
different perspectives and experiences that each individual applicant can
contribute. This relates directly to the “variety of viewpoints” among
minority students referenced by Justice O’Connor.67
Also, at the Fisher I oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli,
arguing in support of the University of Texas race-conscious admissions
policy, took this one step further, noting how such a policy could actually
target minority students who defy racial stereotypes:
Universities . . . are looking . . . to make individualized decisions about
applicants who will directly further the education mission . . . . [f]or example,
they will look for individuals who will play against racial stereotypes . . . .
[t]he African American fencer; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered classical
Greek.68

The enrollment of such students would expose nonminority students to
different perspectives within each minority group, thus contributing to the
educational benefits of diversity and expanding the marketplace of ideas.

65

66

67
68

students with different worldviews and experiences that can enrich the discussions and exchanges
. . . that are so important to a good college education.”); Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity and
Educational Purpose: How Diversity Affects the Classroom Environment and Student Development, in DIVERSITY
CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra, at 187, 189 (citing
Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Influences on Students’ Openness to Diversity and Challenge in the First Year of
College, 67 J. HIGHER EDUC. 174, 188 (1996)).
Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in
DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 64
at 189 (citation omitted). Grutter also highlighted the long-term societal benefits of exposing students
to diverse experiences and perspectives. 539 U.S. at 308 (“[T]he skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures,
ideas, and viewpoints.”).
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (“To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot
use a quota system . . . [it] must be ‘flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity
in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant . . . .’”) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 320.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 61, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No.
11-345).
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Many academic commentators have critiqued the marketplace of ideas
on various grounds. This Essay argues that while these critiques may be valid
in the context of free speech and production of scholarship, they are largely
inapplicable to diversity and student learning.
Perhaps the major critique is that the marketplace does not lead to
“truth” as originally posited by Justice Holmes.69 Professor Stanley Ingber
has argued that “truth,” if and when it exists at all, is not necessarily attained
through such a process: there may be no agreement and an idea’s validity
might not translate into its success or acceptance in a competitive market.70
This critique may be valid with respect to academic scholarship, where in
consensus may be desirable in some disciplines. However, with respect to
student learning and diversity, the goal is not to find “truth” per se. Rather,
the purpose of the marketplace is to give students exposure to various
perspectives on a range of issues, and to expose them to new issues that they
have not thought about before.__As Professor Paul Horwitz notes, the
Supreme Court in Keyishian suggested that academic freedom was valuable
not only as a “search for truth,” but also for “the training and shaping of the
nation’s citizens.”71 The process of engaging different ideas is itself valuable
because the goals for students are not finding “truths” per se, but rather: 1)
Appreciation of different viewpoints from people with different experiences;
2) Development of critical thinking skills; 3) Ability to solve novel problems
that arise in the course of their professional and civic activities; and 4)
Preparation for global leadership.72
As such, in the context of student learning and especially of diversity, the
purpose of the marketplace of ideas is, in some sense, the opposite of what
Justice Holmes espoused. Rather than finding “truth,” the goal is to make
students question the “truths” that they hold and to be able to see and
understand the different “truths” that others hold.73
Scholars have also argued that contrary to Justice Holmes’ ideal,
academia functions mainly to exclude ideas, not to include them. Ideas that
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are not well supported or inapposite must be excluded for an efficient market
and productive debate. _Professor Robert Post notes the discord between the
AAUP definition of academic freedom, which focuses on professional norms
and expert knowledge, and the marketplace notion, which embraces ideas
from all sources.74 Experts produce scholarship which often narrows the
scope of ideas rather than expanding it. In fact, one of the main functions of
scholars is to include and exclude people (and thus ideas) from the circles of
experts in their respective disciplines.
In one sense, this critique is also applicable to a university’s fourth
“essential freedom.” Elite universities in particular are very selective about
the students they admit, in part because their academic reputations depend
on the achievement profiles of their students. However, race-conscious
admissions policies serve to reduce this exclusivity in admissions. The pursuit
of diversity leads to the inclusion of less common perspectives. While
exclusion of ideas may be needed for expertise and advancement of
disciplinary knowledge, diversity promotes the goal of student learning
through broad inclusion of ideas.
Additionally, Professor Ingber has contended that the marketplace
notion emphasizes expression of different ideas at the expense of different
experiences which actually lead to these different ideas.75 He contends that
marketplace notion confuses the dependent (expression) and independent
(experience) variables.76 The compelling interest in diversity addresses this
concern directly. The pursuit of diversity in university admissions relies on
different experiences to produce different ideas.77 Moreover, the relationship
between expression and experience is cyclical. Exposure to different
perspectives is itself an experience that leads students to form new ideas and
view the world in new ways, which again prompts them to seek new
experiences. Through this process, diversity promotes learning and
adaptability through exposure and experience.78
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All of these critiques illustrate that applicability of the marketplace of
ideas to diversity and student learning is on significantly firmer ground than
it is for free speech and scholarship.
Race-conscious admissions policies may also implicate other First
Amendment issues. SFFA v. Harvard aims to eliminate not only consideration
of race in admissions, but also all references to race on university
applications.79 If this remedy is adopted by a public university, one could
argue that it violates applicants’ right to freedom of expression. Also, the
compelling interest that justifies race-conscious admissions is not merely
attaining the educational benefits of diversity, but also maintaining those
benefits.80 Otherwise, the pursuit of diversity in admissions would be
pointless. In Grutter, the Supreme Court noted the need for a “critical mass”
of minority students to insure that these students do not feel “isolated or like
spokespersons for their race.”81 Fisher I reiterated this concern,82 as minority
students must feel welcomed on campus in order to be engaged and
contribute their diverse perspectives to the campus marketplace.83 If it is
necessary to maintain the educational benefits of diversity, universities may
be able to regulate speech and activities that inhibit minority students from
campus engagement. Courts have been hostile towards attempts to regulate
campus hate speech, generally ruling that such regulations are violations of
the First Amendment.84 Ironically, however, some regulation might actually
promote academic freedom in the grand scheme, by creating campus

79
80

81
82

83

84

of adaptability through exposure is also a central theme in developmental psychology, when
analyzing changing conceptions of self. See generally Margaret Beale Spencer, Dena Phillips Swanson
& Vinay Harpalani, Conceptualizing the Self, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE 750 (Richard M. Lerner ed., 2015).
Elise Boddie, A Damaging Bid to Censor Applications at Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/opinion/harvard-affirmative-action-lawsuit.html.
See Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action Debate to
Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75, 110 (2012) (noting that “the
diversity interest may in fact entail both achieving and maintaining diversity.”).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2418 (recognizing “lessening of racial isolation” as one goal of race-conscious
admissions policies). See also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 123 (2004) (explaining how
“critical mass” of diverse students “implies a climate where one can speak freely, where one not
only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard.”).
See generally Vinay Harpalani, “Safe Spaces” and the Educational Benefits of Diversity, 13 DUKE JOURNAL
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 117 (2017) (discussing relationship between safe
spaces and value of diversity in higher education).
See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 55 F.3d 1177, 1182 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a campus speech code which targeted racial and ethnic harassment violated the First Amendment);
see also, State of the Law: Speech Codes, FIRE (last updated 2019) https://www.thefire.org/legal/stateof-the-law-speech-codes/ (discussing cases with similar results as Dambrot).

114

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. XX:N

environment where minority students can contribute more readily to the
marketplace of ideas.85
In sum, there are two prongs to the relationship between race-conscious
admissions policies and academic freedom. First, these policies are
themselves an expression of universities’ academic freedom: Justice
Frankfurter’s fourth “essential freedom” of choosing “who may be admitted
study.”86 Second, through their generation of diversity in the student body,
race-conscious admissions policies expand the marketplace of ideas on
campus and thus facilitate student learning. Accordingly, legal challenges to
race-conscious admissions policies are also challenges to academic freedom,
and courts should view them as such.
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Universities can respond in other ways to campus speech that creates a hostile environment for
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